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How Global is Global Justice? Towards a Global Philosophy 
 
Thom Brooks 
 
Forthcoming in Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Global Justice. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Global justice as a field must confront a central problem: how global is global justice? A 
defining feature about the burgeoning literature in global justice is its operation within a 
bounded, philosophical tradition. Global justice research is too often a product of one 
tradition in self-isolation from others that nonetheless claims to speak for what is best for all. 
This criticism applies to various philosophical traditions whether so-called “analytic,” 
“Continental” or others. The problem is that each tradition too often works independently 
from others to construct new ideas about the promotion of global justice: these ideas are 
designed by some for application to all. “Global” justice may have an international reach, but 
it too often lacks a more global character. The development of a more global approach to 
global justice raises several vexing questions. What does it mean to have a “global” approach 
to global justice? How “global” should any such approach be? And how can a coherent and 
compelling model for it be constructed? 
This chapter develops a new approach for a more distinctly global view of global 
justice: the idea of global philosophy.
1
 Most approaches to global justice are developed 
within bounded philosophical traditions. One problem is that each offers contributions to 
global justice that is constricted by the narrow bounds of their particular tradition. The issue 
is not only that global justice may be overly culturally-specific, but rather that bounded 
traditions close off important resources for addressing philosophical problems that can be 
accessed through closer engagement with other philosophical traditions. A global philosophy 
is then a more “unbound philosophy” better suited for a globalized world (Brooks 2013). Our 
world is ever-changing with ideas and people travelling as never before. It is time for 
philosophy to catch up with these developments and this chapter will explain why and how. 
 
 
Philosophy: bounded by tradition? 
 
Philosophical traditions are often bounded by their traditions. The idea of a philosophical 
tradition is complex. Traditions are frequently sites of great diversity. It is perhaps 
appropriate to speak of many traditions in terms of a wide tent.  
The liberal tradition is a useful illustration. This tradition captures a large range of 
diverse canonical figures from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke through T. H. Green and 
John Stuart Mill to Brian Barry and John Rawls and beyond (Barry 2001; Hobbes 1996; 
Locke 1988; Mill 1989; Rawls 1971; Rawls 1996). Liberals include both advocates and 
opponents of popular democracy. They also include countless others, such as contractarians, 
Hegelians, utilitarians and much more. Their inclusion in a liberal tradition centres on some 
acknowledgments of a shared identity that can be embodied in a common concern or engaged 
conversation. Hobbes and Rawls disagree about several significant issues, but one important 
factor that unites them as fellow members of a shared liberal tradition is their sense of a 
                                                 
1
 This chapter substantially redevelops themes and ideas first presented in Brooks (2013a). 
linked identity and common philosophical belonging to a mutual project. Rawls says that 
Hobbes’ Leviathan is “surely the greatest work of political philosophy in English” and, 
importantly, Rawls understands his project as a further development of problems that Hobbes 
first raises (Rawls 2001, 1). Rawls and Hobbes share a conversation and common concern; 
they are connected through an identity about common concerns and the available horizon of 
possibilities for satisfactorily addressing them. We can locate a common thread linking these 
two figures together, such as the centrality of consent and a contractarian framework. The 
idea of a philosophical tradition is found in this shared belonging and identity, whatever else 
it may be.
2
 
Philosophical traditions often operate within bounds. Each tradition seeks to address 
problems from its own set of philosophical resources. A tradition’s approach to problem 
solving typically excludes substantial engagement with multiple traditions. Admittedly, this is 
more common in contemporary Western philosophical discourses. This is not because they 
are more error-prone, but rather because non-Western traditions operate against a global 
backdrop of a dominant, Western discourse. It has been more generally accepted for work in 
a Western philosophical tradition to lack any connection to or awareness of related work in 
non-Western philosophical traditions, but this is less true vice versa and one example is 
contemporary work in Indian philosophy (Raghuramaraju 2009). 
Philosophical traditions are bounded; each exists like an island in a sea of otherness. 
One illustration is the liberal tradition and its attempts to address the problem of political 
stability over time (Hobbes 1996, Rawls 1996). These attempts may acknowledge non-liberal 
traditions, engagement is limited in most cases to those sharing important spheres of 
established contact breeding greater familiarity. So traditional boundedness may become less 
rigid—or, we might say, less bounded—as engagement becomes further embedded over time. 
Hegel’s philosophy offers an alternative to liberalism, but it engages with canonical liberal 
philosophers and ideas (Brooks 2007, Hegel 1990). This engagement over time across 
traditions has led to later engagement in future (Rawls 1996, 285-88; Rawls 2000, 329-71). 
Such examples are indicative only of how traditions containing great diversity should 
be understood as bounded, but not closed. A closed tradition is one which would deny any 
engagement with other traditions. While most philosophical discourses can be located within 
a single tradition, few omit any acknowledgement of others. The issue is not whether a 
tradition is open or closed, but rather whether a tradition might benefit from becoming 
unbound through engaging more substantially with alternative traditions. So philosophical 
traditions, especially in the West, are bounded although this comes in degrees.  
It is surprising to discover how relatively rarely different philosophical traditions 
substantively engage with one another. One reason is that an established history of mutual 
engagement has a long track record of leading to important innovations for each participating 
tradition (Bosanquet 1923, Brooks 2012, Brudner 2009, Green 1986). There is much potential 
future promise for additional philosophical pay-offs from wider engagement with new and 
less familiar traditions as these examples indicate. This is not overlook existing and 
important, fruitful attempts at bridging Western and non-Western philosophical traditions 
(Barnhart 2012, Carpenter and Ganeri 2010, Hutton 2006, Hutton 2008, Parekh 2006). 
However, it is to argue that such attempts are too rare and much more should be encouraged. 
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 My discussion is meant to be indicative and not exhaustive. Nor do I want to suggest that a tradition is a mere 
set of family resemblances. Whatever else a tradition may be, I claim that a tradition is related to a recognition 
of a shared belonging. I am unable to explore further issues concerning the possible roles for intended meanings 
and their reception which I bracket here because of space constraints. Nonetheless, I note my awareness of these 
and other important issues that may bear on my analysis (Bevir 2002, Brooks 2006). 
Philosophical Bridge Building 
 
There have been several attempts at bridge building between Western and non-Western 
philosophical traditions. This typically takes the form of so-called ‘comparative philosophy’ 
in the West (see Scharfstein 1998). Comparative philosophy is a largely underexplored and 
neglected disciplinary area that has not attracted widespread attention from leading figures in 
the field. This is notwithstanding important advances for our knowledge about our 
philosophical traditions and illuminating revealing points of relation to others. One well 
known example is research uncovering fascinating philosophical connections between 
Machiavelli’s The Prince and Kautilya’s Arthasastra (Brown 1953: 49-52). 
 Comparative philosophy has failed as a disciplinary project to convince most 
philosophers to see the need for wider engagement with different traditions.
3
 One possible 
reason for this might be that comparative philosophy has focused too often in the history of 
philosophy examining various canonical figures and how their ideas relate to each other. This 
has not attracted satisfactory attention from scholars working in the history of particular 
historical figures or time-periods. Comparative philosophy may fare even less well with 
philosophers working on non-historical topics. So the study of Kant and issues such as the 
development of legal realism or work on the doctrine of double effect has been largely 
untouched by insights exposed by comparative philosophy.  
The problem is that case has not yet satisfactorily been made for the philosophical 
importance of bringing bridges between traditions.
4
 This is a case that can and should be 
made. Global justice offers a terrific example. It should be surprising that global justice as a 
field has developed as a closed tradition claiming international reach. In short, global justice 
isn’t global, but partial. Most of the leading work in global justice can be found within a 
relatively narrow set of philosophical traditions in the West (Brooks 2008a). Global 
problems, such as so-called ‘just war’ theories or the existence of severe poverty, are neither 
exclusively Western nor non-Western. Yet, global justice research too often addresses these 
global problems in a non-global way from a partial, perhaps even tribal, approach locked 
within a bounded philosophical tradition. This approach fails to capture the global diversity 
of rich philosophical resources on hand to respond to these and other pressing international 
problems. If global justice is about justice for the globe, then we should be encouraged to at 
least consider how our philosophical insights might become more global: global justice may 
require a global philosophy. 
But let us clarify further how “global” our global problems are. First, these problems 
are global geographically. This is obvious: global problems occur across continents. 
Secondly, global problems are also global philosophically. These problems are not the 
exclusive subject-matter for any one philosophical tradition. So the issue here is that much of 
the most influential work on global justice has operated almost entirely within a relatively 
bounded approach. Global justice is about global problems, but its formulation has lacked 
sufficient global thought. Global philosophy aims to fill this void. 
My argument is not that standard, Western approaches to global justice should be 
jettisoned. There remains much of vital interest and recent breakthroughs have been 
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 It pains me to state this claim. My original philosophical interest was in Indian philosophy and comparative 
political thought aiming to reveal arresting points of relation and contrast between figures working 
independently of each other in different traditions. I continue to find this field a rich source of philosophical 
insight and understanding. This may underscore my belief that more philosophers may come to see the benefit 
of building philosophical bridges when there is a more clear philosophical pay-off rather than mere intellectual 
curiosity. 
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 My claim is that the case for the philosophical importance has not been made because the intrinsic interest, I 
take it, is more obvious. 
particularly exciting. Nevertheless, my claim is that this work might be improved much 
further through greater philosophical engagement through bridge building with other 
traditions. Global justice has been insufficiently global philosophically. Different traditions 
can and should meaningfully engage with each other to improve philosophical problem-
solving. Once bridges are built long-term positive engagement can grow. But the problem is 
that these bridges are so difficult to forge. The challenge is to make a more convincing case 
for why new philosophical horizons are worth exploring for greater philosophical benefit. I 
believe it is time our philosophy rose to this great challenge by ending its bounded approach 
to global problems: global justice deserves a more global philosophy. 
 
 
Global Philosophy: The New Frontier? 
 
Global philosophy is an unbounded approach. It is a method whereby we open our individual 
tradition to others beyond our immediate boundaries to pursue philosophical benefits. Global 
philosophy is unfettered by self-limitation to engagement with what is established and 
familiar; it is open to what is new. Global philosophy can be adopted by any and all whether 
liberal, Hegelian, post-structuralist or others. For example, the liberal or radical feminist 
engages in global philosophy by an openness to exploring new ideas from a wider range of 
philosophical traditions. Global philosophy is motivated by the potential for an improved 
ability to address philosophical problems through revised or new philosophical resources. So 
a liberal global philosophy might attempt to engage with traditions of both East and West to 
reveal new insights that might be redeployed within liberalism improving its success at 
constructing compelling arguments. A global philosophical approach is about improving the 
traditions we work within. So global philosophy is not about abandoning our individual 
traditions, but rather their growth and improved success. Stated differently, global philosophy 
is unbounded in its not being bound entirely within any one philosophical tradition. Thus, 
global philosophy is about opening the horizons for the traditions we wish to improve and 
reinvigorate. Global philosophy – to be clear – is not unbounded in the sense of lacking any 
bounds: its aim is about improving our traditions and not merging all into a single World 
Philosophy. 
 I have highlighted throughout the notion of the Western philosophical tradition – 
broadly defined – as a relatively bounded tradition. This distinction is made because the 
situation is generally different for non-Western philosophical traditions, such as found in 
Indian thought (see Ganeri 2011; Parekh 2006; Raghuramaraju 2011; Sivaraksa 1992). There 
is an increasing amount of work aiming to make Indian and other Asian philosophical 
traditions more accessible to a Western audience as well (see Bushan and Garfield 2011; 
Nhat Hanh 2008; Kontrul 1987). Furthermore, there is highly impressive work undertaken 
within the Indian philosophical tradition that has developed with a deep awareness (and 
appreciation) of developments in Western philosophical traditions (see Radhakrishnan and 
Moore 1957, 575-637; Raghuramaraju 2006; Raghuramaraju 2009). The problem is not that 
non-Western philosophical traditions have nothing interesting to offer or lack philosophical 
sophistication. Nor is the problem for a lack of trying to communicate to a Western audience, 
especially as this work has become increasingly available. While so many Indian 
philosophers have engaged meaningfully with Western philosophical ideas, this has 
regrettably not been reciprocated. 
 There are several ways in which our taking more seriously an engagement with less 
familiar philosophical traditions may lead to illuminating avenues for future work in fields 
such as global justice. My illustrations will be confined to how Western traditions might 
engage further with Indian philosophical traditions. These examples are meant to be only 
indicative of the likely future benefits of building bridges between philosophical traditions: 
an exhaustive examination would require several volumes. Plus, the main hurdle is 
convincing philosophers working in Western traditions to see the value in greater engagement 
with non-Western traditions and not vice versa. Indian philosophy is selected because it is a 
non-Western tradition that I’m most familiar with. I do not claim or suggest that it has any 
exclusive bridges to Western thought over and above other non-Western traditions. 
 Take the issue of our diverse identities. Every society contains social spaces filled 
with diversity. The challenge lies in how to respond best to maintaining political stability 
over time in light of the reasonable pluralism that characterizes each society. This is 
understood as the problem of political stability (Rawls 1996, 3-4). One solution to this 
problem is the creation of an overlapping consensus through the use of public reasons (Rawls 
1996, 131-72). The idea is that reasons acceptable to all provide satisfactory public support 
for polices that respect the reasonable diversity around us. 
 This solution has not gone unchallenged. Several important objections have been 
raised. One is that any overlapping consensus we construct might be too fragile to guarantee 
political stability because of our deep differences (see Wenar 1995). A second objection is 
that an overlapping consensus should be rejected as a contractarian, and thereby flawed, view 
about justice (see Nussbaum 2006). Instead, we require some further connection between 
persons to secure stability, such as bolstering an overlapping consensus by the guarantee of a 
social minimum consisting in capabilities (see Brooks 2014). 
 The Indian philosophical tradition offers several useful insights into how problems 
like this might be better addressed. The first insight is to challenge the model of so-called 
“moral monism” and the resistance to cultural pluralism found at the core of much Western 
political thought: we should develop greater understanding of an “intercultural” (and not 
merely multicultural) view about equality and fairness, a perspective indebted to Indian 
philosophical traditions (see Parekh 2006). A further insight might be the view that political 
stability is best secured through guaranteeing a threshold of human capabilities (see 
Nussbaum 2000, Brooks 2014). Indeed, the capabilities approach is to some degree a major 
achievement of a more global philosophical approach to problem-solving with deep roots in 
multiple traditions, including Aristotelianism and classical Indian philosophy (see Sen 2009). 
This approach claims all persons should have their well-being guaranteed in terms of a 
capability to do or be (where debates continue about what should constitute our capabilities 
and how many we have). Political stability is thought best secured through the protection of 
human capabilities. But how we understand “capabilities” is a product in some measure of 
intercultural thought and interchange between traditions. Resources in Indian philosophical 
traditions can be mined to supplement or further develop Western philosophical traditions to 
improve their resourcefulness in providing new insights into how we should best address the 
challenge of diversity in modern society, a growing problem for both domestic and 
international politics as globalization becomes an ever greater presence in our collective 
lives. 
 A second philosophical issue concerns our moral duties. The standard view of most 
Western philosophers is that moral duties cannot conflict. But can there be possible conflicts? 
Immanuel Kant argues our moral duties do not conflict because they flow from a universal 
moral law (Kant 2011). Hegel famously rejects this argument as “an empty formalism” 
lacking in content (see 1990, 161-63; Brooks 2013b). Notwithstanding whichever side we 
might choose, the idea that our duties should not – and perhaps never – conflict has continued 
appeal for many, if not most, Western philosophers today. The potential problem is this view 
might be more dogmatic in its insistence upon non-contradiction among moral duties 
divorced from reality. It is not difficult to consider cases of potential moral conflict between 
what we might some versus what could be owed others. 
 The Indian philosophical tradition provides real use for us on this issue. The 
Bhagavad Gita is one of the most well-known Indian texts. The Gita contains a famous 
dialogue between the divine Krishna and the human warrior Arjuna (see Radhakrishnan 
1948). The dialogue’s setting is the eve of a great battle pitting Arjuna and his army against 
his cousins. Arjuna is concerned: while his cause is no doubt just and victory appears certain, 
these results can only be obtained through much bloodshed and human suffering including 
the death of many, such as his own relatives. Arjuna has a moral duty to fight his righteous 
battle, but also a moral duty to support his family and avoid causing them harm. Arjuna 
becomes resigned to the view that perhaps it would better to permit his unjust cousins to 
govern if only to avoid confronting his clash of duties. Krishna advises Arjuna that his view 
is mistaken: he must engage in battle using, in Amartya Sen’s words, “duty-centred and 
consequence-independent reasoning” (Sen 2009, 209). (Note that this account reveals new 
horizons of “duty-centred” ethics and “consequence-independent reasoning” that is neither 
consequentialist nor deontological, or at least not in the traditional ways these views have 
been understood in Western traditions.) 
 We may learn several suggestive lessons from this account. The first is that any duty 
we have to justice trumps our other duties where these duties might conflict. Arjuna might 
have duties to his just cause and duties against causing harm to his relatives: our moral duties 
can conflict and where they do our duties to justice are primary. The second suggestive lesson 
is that our duties require commitments. The decision to perform duties might be 
consequence-independent, but the resolve to satisfy our duties must account for our personal 
responsibilities (Sen 2009, 213-14). Some moral decisions may be easier said than done: this 
is independent from questions about whether we might suffer from any weakness of will. The 
claim that we should weigh up our different prospective moral duties in light of our full range 
of moral commitments informs important work in the Western philosophical tradition, too: 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is an example (Hegel 1990). So my argument is not that Western 
traditions lack a similar perspective, but rather that they might benefit from a closer 
engagement with related ideas found in less familiar traditions. 
 The implications for global justice are clear. Much of the debates about any 
responsibilities affluent states or people have to those in severe poverty is often couched in 
terms of our duties (see Pogge 2002, Singer 1972). Philosophers choose sides between 
accounts focused on positive or negative duties and other considerations of the moral duties 
we might owe distant others. But are these the only or even best ways to address such a 
pressing international problem? Is our solution to one of our biggest international, 
humanitarian challenges to work within a single, largely culturally-specific enterprise to 
determine universal moral duties binding on all meant to illuminate the way forward? Is it 
desirable, if possible, to defend approaches to global problems that fail to acknowledge the 
potential merits of approaches to thinking about moral duty found in non-Western societies? 
These questions are deliberately provocative, but I hope point towards the strong intuitive 
appeal of the need for global justice to be more global for it to have greater authority (and to 
be more compelling) as a theory about justice. 
 My brief illustrations have covered issues such as diversity and the problem of 
political stability as well as the problem of conflicting moral duties. These are longstanding 
problems in ethics and political philosophy with clear relevance for global justice. But 
perhaps a more clear issue as an issue of global justice concerns so-called “just war” theory. 
The standard, Western view of just war theory is that wars can be justified: a side can be right 
to wage war against others. Debates largely centre on which specific justifications are 
sufficient to confirm a war as “just.” These debates have developed substantially in recent 
years after pioneering work by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas where it had been argued that 
just wars required elements, such as a just cause, just conduct and waged by a just 
government (Augustine 1998, Aquinas 2002). Current debates centre on Jeff McMahan’s 
powerful critique of orthodox just war theory where he rejects the moral equivalence of 
combatants (McMahan 2011). This orthodox view is that combatants on all sides have moral 
equivalence: in war, all are equal and the only persons who ought not be harmed are non-
combatants (on all sides). McMahan argues that this view rests on an important mistake and, 
in fact, unjust combatants lack moral equivalence in war. So it is not the case that all 
combatants may be liable for attack during warfare. Instead, only unjust combatants can be 
held liable. And so debates have moved forward to work out the wider implications of this 
now increasingly dominant view: how to identify the “just” versus “unjust” combatants? Who 
are “combatants”? And so on. 
 If McMahan’s challenge to orthodox just war theory marked a revolution in this field, 
then Indian philosophy might reveal a second revolution. McMahan and others may disagree 
on several important issues, but all agree that wars can be justified even if what might figure 
in considerations about their justification remains hotly contested. Buddhism is a religion 
with roots in India and well-known for its general opposition to violence. The Dalai Lama, a 
Tibetan in exile in India, in his Ethics for a New Millennium argues that harm to other 
sentient beings is wrongful and beyond justification (1999). Justifying causing harm does 
nothing but add to the suffering already in existence today. If decreasing, if not ending, harm 
is a crucial good, then we should stop justifying hurting others and even in self-defence. Of 
course, this has strong connections to early Greek thought: in the Crito, Socrates also 
accepted the view it was better to suffer harm than cause it.
5
  
 The implication for just war theory is that “just war theory” is based on a mistake, 
namely, that war can be “just.” All wars involve the deaths of non-combatant civilians who 
are innocent. Such activity might be excused based on certain narrow justifications including 
the cause of the conflict and how any activity is conducted. The analogy is individual self-
defence. No one is “just” in causing harm to others even if wrongly attacked by others. Any 
self-defence is not a just harm inflicted to others, but rather an excused harm: self-defence is 
not a right (such as a right to free expression or to cast electoral ballots), but a defence against 
prosecution for crimes where the elements of a specific crime may be otherwise found. So I 
do not require any defence where no crime might have been committed, but I do otherwise. If 
I have not been attacked or threatened by another, then my actions may be unlikely to 
constitute self-defence. Likewise, if I am attacked and refuse or unable to fight back, then I 
have not engaged in self-defence. But if I have harmed another, then I may require a defence 
against any charge of assault or perhaps causing actual bodily harm. Self-defence is an 
excuse, a defence to prosecution to charges that might otherwise hold. Similarly, we might 
see engaging in war as an activity that is always wrong, but sometimes excused. And so war 
is an evil to be avoided wherever necessary, but sometimes necessary if never “just” (or 
morally good). 
 Note the way this is phrased. The insight from the Dalai Lama and its relevance for 
Western views about just war theory need not be the theory should be abandoned because we 
should endorse pacifism. Instead, a key idea is to identify the ever-present wrongness of war 
and reinterpret this in a way that might best bring out already present philosophical resources 
– for example, common understandings of self-defence from legal philosophy – to further 
develop our tradition. Nor is this the only way we might find uses for ideas imported from 
other traditions in our own traditions. 
 I conclude this section by considering a different issue: what is the goal of 
philosophical disputes? For many in the Western tradition, this may be little more than the 
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aim for greater clarity into some important philosophical issue. Or perhaps others may be 
motivated by the goal of convincing others into agreement. 
 Broadly conceived, the Indian philosophical tradition has a fairly clear position on 
this issue: our goal is to seek liberation (see Radhakrishnan and Moore 1957, 46-47, 95-96; 
Swami 1935). Literally speaking, the truth will set you free (Rinpoche 1991). This idea of 
liberation is through a pursuit of knowledge carrying several connotations that are 
philosophical, religious and otherwise. Nonetheless, there is something genuinely liberating 
about the satisfaction we enjoy from improving our understanding about philosophical issues. 
Perhaps our pursuit of philosophical arguments is not merely for their own sake, but to learn 
more about ourselves. In these ways, this philosophical tradition may help inform how we 
engage in philosophical disputes. 
 Let me conclude this part of the discussion by reaffirming that my comments here are 
intentionally suggestive and only indicative of where future benefits might be mined from 
non-Western philosophical traditions. My ambition is to argue our issues are not exhaustively 
considered by any one tradition and that alternative traditions may contain resources worth 
re-employing for our traditions. The importance of global philosophy is that it may encourage 
us to look more closely at our debates in new ways and with new insights. In short, global 
philosophy is about better philosophy. 
 
 
The Challenges for a Global Philosophy 
 
There are several potential challenges for the future promise and popular appeal of global 
philosophy for global justice and other areas in philosophy. I will consider a range of 
potential challenges here in order to identify the possible obstacles – many of which are a 
commonplace in discussions I have participated in over the years – and show how global 
philosophy can overcome them. 
 The first possible challenge is the redundancy objection. This is the view that global 
philosophy might yield greater redundancy rather than illumination. The worry is that less 
familiar traditions might be too far removed for any meaningful engagement philosophical or 
otherwise. Instead, we should cash out these less familiar traditions in ways that are more 
readily recognizable to enable progress. The problem is that this may render less familiar 
traditions largely redundant. Suppose we understood an unfamiliar philosophical tradition in 
light of its close proximity to another more familiar. So we attempt to grasp the work of the 
philosopher Shankara in terms of a related Hegelian-inspired philosophy. While this might 
help render Shankara’s distinctive Advaita Vendantan philosophy more intelligible in some 
sense, the problem is we might remain better off examining Hegelian philosophy more 
closely instead. If all insights from Shankara are limited to the medium of Hegelian 
philosophy, then we don’t have any clear pay-off from considering these insights. To grasp 
Shankara in this way is to reinvent our philosophical wheel. 
 The redundancy objection mistakes the goal of global philosophy. The goal is not to 
compare and contrast, but rather uncover new philosophical insights to further develop our 
own traditions. A deeper engagement with figures such as Shankara is surely highly 
rewarding on many levels, but this is also highly time intensive. The goal of a global 
philosophy-inspired approach is not necessarily to inspect and comprehend every possible 
school of thought. Instead, our goal is to further develop our own tradition through 
engagement with others. We need not come to any definitive views about alternative 
traditions. What matters is how their ideas may be put to good philosophical use within our 
tradition. Global philosophy is not about making philosophy more redundant, but rather 
shining greater light on wider philosophical diversity. 
 A second concern is the incoherence objection. This concerns the issue that our 
traditions possess some identifiable coherence that makes possible their recognition as a 
tradition. The problem is that a closer engagement with other traditions could undermine the 
existing coherence found in our traditions rendering them incoherent. We should then avoid 
unbounded philosophical pursuits and instead maintain the distinctiveness – and separateness 
– of our philosophical positions. 
 This objection rests on a mistake about the nature of philosophical traditions. 
Traditions are never static and constantly evolving in response to changing issues confronting 
traditions over time. One good example already highlighted previously concerns the historical 
development of liberalism from Hobbes through Mill to Rawls. Traditions change. The 
problem cannot be that we might revise our arguments in light of engagement with alternative 
traditions and so produce change within our philosophical tradition. On the contrary, our goal 
should be to improve the ability of our tradition to address philosophical issues. We should 
actively forage for new resources that better facilitate this goal. One promising approach is 
the idea of philosophy as unbounded and engaged with diverse traditions. Global philosophy 
need not render any tradition incoherent. However, it may help improve our ability to address 
philosophical issues. The benefits clearly outweigh the costs. 
 A final, third problem is the objection that global philosophy may be insufficiently 
global. What is so “global” about “global philosophy”? Global philosophy is an unbounded 
approach to how traditions might improve their ability to solve philosophical problems. 
Global philosophy is not a claim to there being one true Philosophy that best combines all 
others: global philosophy is not a World Philosophy. Nor is global philosophy about bringing 
together as many traditions as possible for their own sake. Instead, global philosophy is about 
our having an openness, a receptiveness for the need to pursue wider philosophical 
engagement in order to improve our potential philosophical argumentative power. Global 
philosophy is only global in terms of its pursuit for philosophical resources. Nonetheless, it 
remains true that some philosophers, such as Hegel, have defended philosophical accounts 
about philosophical developments across the world in an attempt to bring them together in 
one unity. However, global philosophy need not be about speaking to all traditions – this 
might even be impossible because they are too plentiful – but rather speaking with diverse 
traditions. This not pursued for its own sake, but rather philosophical improvement through 
unbounded openness to new horizons. 
 These three main objections to global philosophy are not exhaustive. Nevertheless, 
they offer serious obstacles that must be overcome by global philosophy if it is to become a 
more dominant approach to future philosophical developments. Global philosophy can 
overcome these problems although it must be born in mind that “global philosophy” as an 
approach exists only in its infancy. I consider myself to be addressing a philosophical field 
that I firmly believe will rise to some future prominence in academic circles and not 
identifying any established field.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Global philosophy is an approach to philosophical problem-solving that is likely to become 
more commonplace as our societies (and universities) further diversify. While many 
philosophers have already engaged meaningfully across different traditions, this engagement 
has been largely confined to established and more familiar links. More importantly, this work 
too often excludes meaningful engagement more widely with less familiar traditions, 
including Indian philosophy. There have been any number of substantial contributions 
already that arise from deep engagement, but these have been largely restricted to the 
relatively marginalized sub-field of comparative philosophy where analysis is often limited to 
historical comparisons without highlighting clearly enough the wider merits of bridging 
philosophical traditions for problem-solving.  
 This situation has contributed to a crisis of sorts for work in global justice. The main 
problem is not that this work is substandard or lacks for fascinating insights into our most 
pressing problems. No, the problem is that there isn’t much “global” about “global justice” 
philosophically-speaking. Global justice might be about justice for all, but the ideas that 
underpin these views of justice too often develop within bounded traditions.  
 Global philosophy accepts this challenge. It calls on each of us to engage across 
philosophical traditions and build bridges. The goal is not to develop one single view of 
Philosophy for all, but to improve the philosophical traditions we already accept. I have 
indicated briefly potential areas for how such engagement might be established and my 
discussion only indicative of the wider possibilities of global philosophy extend far beyond 
these fields and traditions. 
 If we want global justice to become more global, then we should warmly embrace a 
future with an unbounded, global philosophy. We have much to learn from other traditions to 
improve our understanding of philosophical issues. As our world grows ever smaller, so our 
philosophical engagement should develop ever more widely. Philosophy should become less 
bounded and tribal and more unbounded and engaged. The future, in short, is global 
philosophy. And this should prove to be good news for work in global justice and for 
philosophy more generally.
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